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I. INTRODUCTION

The ability to freely vote for the candidate of one's choice is the touchstone of
a free and open democratic system of government.1 The right to vote is a

fundamental political right, which preserves all other rights.2 To avoid the

compromise of other rights, citizens must vigorously guard their voting rights.3
Voting rights are closely associated with the rights of candidates to seek political
office. 4 Thus, in the spirit of ensuring that there is equal access to the political
process, the requirements of candidates seeking election to federal and state office
5
are minimal.
The United States Constitution's Qualifications Clause6 merely requires that a
member of Congress must have attained the age of twenty-five years old, and must
have been a United States citizen for seven years.7 The California Constitution
likewise requires minimal qualifications! An individual is eligible to be a member
of the California Legislature if he or she is a registered voter,9 has been a resident
of the legislative district for one year, 0 is a citizen of the United States," and has
12
been a resident of California for three years immediately preceding the election.
In light of the minimal requirements for seeking elective office, both the United
States and the California Constitution provide expansive opportunities for
individuals to pursue political office as candidates. Correspondingly, voters are
presented with potentially a broad spectrum of candidates to choose from when

1.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,555 (1964) (characterizing the right of an individual to vote freely
for the candidate of one's choice as the essence of a democratic society).
2. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (recognizing the political franchise of voting not
as a natural right, but one generally conceded by society as a fundamental political right).
3.
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (opining that the right of citizens to vote for the
individuals who make the laws under which they must live is a most precious right).
4. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,438 (1992) (indicating that voters' rights and candidates' rights
do not lend themselves to easy separation).
5.
See infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (setting forth the qualifications an individual must meet to
serve in Congress or as a California legislator); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 820
(1995) (generalizing that every man who enjoys the confidence of his fellow citizens may qualify as a candidate
for Congress); Thornton, 514 U.S. at 819 (stating that "[n]o qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith or
of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people").
6.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl.
2.
7.
See k ("No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five
Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States and who shall not, when elected be an inhabitant of that
State in which he shall be chosen.").
8. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(c).
9.
See id.
("A person isineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless the person is an elector.. .").
10. See id. ("A person is ineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless the person... (has been] a
resident of the legislative district for one year....").
11. See id. ("A person is ineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless the person is... a citizen of
the United States....).
12. See id. ("A person is ineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless the person... [has been] a
resident of California for three years, immediately preceding the election.").
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exercising their right to choose their representatives. t3 However, the United States
Constitution provides that states are granted the power to regulate elections. 4 Thus,

the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for political purposes
through the ballot are not absolute. 5
On November 6, 1990, the voters of California joined twenty other states1 6 in
enacting some form of legislative term limits.17 Generally, state term limits restrict
the number of consecutive terms which legislators may serve or limit the number

of years that a legislator can hold office within a specified time frame." California
joined only six other states to impose lifetime bans on legislative service after
holding office a specific number of terms in either the lower or upper house.19
During the period leading up to Proposition 140, disenchantment with the
political process grew based on the perception that the California Legislature was
dominated by unchallenged career politicians more interested in advancing their
individual political careers and agendas than the public interest. Based on this

sentiment, an amendment to the California Constitution, Proposition

2
14 0 , 0 was

13. See Canaan v. Abdelnour, 40 Cal. 3d 703, 727, 710 P.2d 268, 283, 221 Cal. Rptr. 468, 483 (1985)
(invalidating a municipal provision which prohibited write-in voting because of its effect of preventing voters from
casting their ballots for the candidates of their choice). But cf. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S.
1, 14 (1982) (upholding a Puerto Rican statute allowing a political party the power to fill an interim vacancy in the
Legislature without holding an election); see id. at 5-6 n.4 (indicating that 22 states have adopted similar statutes
which allow legislative vacancies to be filled by appointment).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (providing that, "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed by each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of [choosing] Senators.").
15. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,433 (1992) (recognizing that while voting is a fundamental right
under the Constitution, limitations and regulatory control, such as allowing the States to regulate their own
elections, are also provided in the Constitution).
16. See Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp. 1446, 1454 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (providing a list of six states in
addition to California that have enacted lifetime limits on legislative service, and fourteen states which have enacted
some other form of legislative term limits); see also infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (setting forth states
that enacted consecutive and lifetime term limits).
17. See Bates, 958 F. Supp. at 1454 (asserting that term limits encourage greater constituent response by
moving away from a legislature dominated by career politicians).
18. See id. at 1454 n.5; see, e.g., ARIZ. CONS?. art. IV, pt. 2, § 21 (limiting legislative service to four
consecutive terms in office); COLO. CONS?. art. V, § 3 (confining legislative service to four consecutive terms in
the lower house, two consecutive terms in the upper house); FL.A. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (restricting legislative service
to eight consecutive years in office); LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(E) (restraining legislative service to three consecutive
terms); MoNT. CONS?. art. IV, § 8 (limiting legislative service to eight years within the preceding sixteen years);
NEB. CONST. art. I1, § 8 (confining legislative service to two consecutive terms).
19. See ARK. CONST. amend. 73, § 2 (reducing legislative service to three terms in the lower house and two
terms in the upper house); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 54 (restraining legislative service to three terms in lower house
and two terms in upper house); MO. CONST. art. HI, § 8 (limiting legislative service to eight years in one house and
sixteen years in both houses); NEV. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3-4 (confining legislative service to twelve years service in
both houses); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 17A (curbing legislative service to twelve years service in both houses); OR.
CONST. art. II, § 19 (restricting legislative service to six years in lower house and eight years in upper house).
20. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1.5-2 (amending the California Constitution through Proposition 140:
Limits on Terms of Office, Legislators' Retirement, Legislative Operating Costs. Initiative Constitutional

Amendment).
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placed on the November 1990 ballot through the initiative process.2 Proposition
140 provides, "m he Senate has a membership of 40 Senators elected for 4-year
terms...
.No Senator may serve more than 2 terms. The Assembly has a
membership of 80 members elected for 2-year terms. No member of the Assembly
may serve more than 3 terms."' 2 The initiative sought to reduce the advantages of
incumbency generated by unlimited terms in office by limiting the number of terms
legislators could serve.2 The purpose of Proposition 140 was to shift the
concentration of political power away from the entrenched "career politicians"
toward the "citizen representatives" envisioned by the Founding Fathers.2 '
In Bates v. Jones,25 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that
Proposition 140 requires a lifetime ban on state legislators after serving three terms
in the Assembly and two terms in the Senate,2' provided sufficient notice of a
lifetime ban to voters, and did not violate plaintiffs"a First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.29 The Ninth Circuit further held that imposing lifetime term
limits on state legislators is a neutral candidacy qualification, which a state has a
right to impose.30 Finally, while the Ninth Circuit concedes that Proposition 140 has
a minimal impact on the plaintiffs' rights, it is justified by the state's interest in
limiting "unfair incumbent advantages" in order to promote competitive elections. 31
Part 1iof this Casenote begins by examining the case law addressing term limits
leading up to Bates v. Jones.32 Part HI of this Casenote traces the unusual path

21.

See id. § 2(a) (limiting the number of terms legislators may serve); see also Bates, 958 F. Supp. at 1455

(explaining that Proposition 140 also imposed term limits on a variety of other state offices which were not
challenged in the lawsuit); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (reserving the powers of the initiative and referendum to the
people). See generally CAL ELEC. CODE §§ 9000-9015 (West 1996) (setting forth the process for qualifying an
initiative for the ballot).
22. CAL CONST. art. IV, § 2(a).
23. See CAL. CONST. art. IV,§ 1.5 (declaring that "it]he increased concentration of political power in the
hands of incumbent representatives has made our electoral system less free, less competitive, and less
representative"); id. (stating that the "powers of incumbency must be limited" in order "to restore a free and
democratic system of fair elections"); see also Bates, 958 F. Supp. at 1454-55 (criticizing that the ability of
legislators to serve unlimited terms in office presents incumbents with an unfair advantage over other candidates).
24. See Bates, 958 F. Supp. at 1455 (referencing the preamble of Proposition 140 providing the purpose and
intent of the amendment).
25. 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
26. See iULat 846 (agreeing with the California Supreme Court that Proposition 140 required lifetime bans).
27. See id (stating thatthe ballot materials and the surrounding context of the measure provided sufficient
notice that Proposition 140 required lifetime bans).
28. The plaintiffs included former Assemblyman Bates and other state legislators.
29. See Bates, 958 F. Supp. at 847 (providing that the lifetime term limits, imposed by Proposition 140, are
a neutral candidacy requirement, not a discriminatory restriction, and are justified by the state's legitimate interest
in incumbency reform).
30. See id (providing that the state has the right to impose neutral candidacy qualifications).
31. See id (asserting that Proposition 140's impact on the right to vote for acandidate of one's choice and
the right of an incumbent to continue to run for his or her office is not severe, and is justified by the state's interest
in restoring competitive elections).
32. See infra Part II.A-B (discussing state and federal term limit cases prior to the decision in Bates).
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California's term limits initiative traveled to reach judicial adjudication. 3 Finally,
this Casenote analyzes the legal and social ramifications of the Bates decision. 4

Specifically, this Casenote develops and explores the impact of the Bates decision
in light of the constitutional, federalism, and public policy issues raised by
implementing term limits on state legislators through the
initiative process.3 5 This
6
decided.
correctly
Casenote concludes that Bates was

I1. TERM LIMITs CASES

PRIOR TO AND LEADING TO BATES

A. State Term Limits Cases

1. Legislature v. Eu
Prior to the Ninth Circuit decision in Bates v. Jones,37 a similar case was heard

in 1991 by the California Supreme Court. In Legislaturev. Eu,38 several legislators
were joined by select constituents and the body of the California Legislature to

contest the validity of Proposition 140 by jointly filing a petition for writ of
mandate to the California Supreme Court.39 The language of Proposition 140 was

ambiguous 4° in that it was difficult to decipher whether the measure imposed a
lifetime ban, or a limit on consecutive terms.4 This raised interpretive and
constitutional questions regarding the measure's validity.4 2 Adopting a deferential
approach in analyzing initiatives, the court noted that, "[A]ll presumptions favor the
validity of initiative measures.... Such measures must be upheld unless their
unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. ' '4

33. See infra Part El (analyzing the opinions of the district court, the court of appeals' three judge panel,
and the court of appeals sitting en banc).
34. See infra Part IV.A-B (addressing the issues ofjurisdiction, voting as a fundamental right, due process
and notice requirements, and commenting on the societal impacts of the Bates decision).
35. See infra Part IV.B (setting forth the social impact of the Bates decision).
36. See infra Part V (summarizing that Proposition 140's lifetime ban on state legislators is a constitutional
exercise of direct democracy).
37. 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997).
38. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991).
39. See Bates, 958 F. Supp. at 1455 (discussing the legal history of Proposition 140).
40. See CAL. CONST. art. IV,§ 2(a) (providing that "[n]o Senator may serve more than 2 terms").
41. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 493, 503, 816 P.2d 1309, 1314, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288 (1991)
(presenting the California Supreme Court with the interpretive question of determining whether Proposition 140
imposes a lifetime ban or consecutive term limits on legislators).
42. Id.
43. Id, at 501,816 P.2d at 1313,286 Cal. Rptr. at 287. But see J.Clark Kelso, California'sConstitutional
Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 327, 344-47 (1992) (emphasizing that instead of adhering to a presumption of
constitutionality, the courts should have followed the "Rule of Caution," wherein legislation pursued and enacted
by the will of the electorate is strictly construed); iaLat 367-68 (stating that despite the presumption of
constitutionality, the California Supreme Court has struck down all or significant portions of half of the voter
initiatives between 1964 and 1990); see also Michael Higgins, Defending Risky Propositions:Judges Have Never
Been Reluctantto Overturn Referenda, to Critics'Dismay, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 34-35 (indicating that from 1990
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The California Supreme Court customarily declines to exercise original
jurisdiction on most cases, preferring initial disposition by the lower courts. 4
However, because the case involved issues of sufficient public importance, the
court reasoned that it was both appropriate and justified to exercise original

jurisdiction. 5
In Eu, the issue of whether Proposition 140 enacted lifetime term limits or
consecutive term limits was settled in favor of lifetime term limits.' Petitioners, the
individual legislators and some of their constituents, argued that Proposition 140
imposed a lifetime ban, 47 while the Secretary of State, the respondent, argued that
only consecutive term limits are imposed." The California Supreme Court held that
Proposition 140 imposes a "lifetime ban" on legislators who have served the
specified number of terms pursuant to the initiative. 49 Thus, the court rejected the
Secretary of State's argument that Proposition 140 merely imposes a limit on the
number of consecutive terms legislators could serve." Noting that the language of
the measure was ambiguous, the court concluded that the "indicia of the voters'
intent ' '5' strongly supported the position that a lifetime ban was intended by both

to 1997, California judges struck down three of eighteen initiatives, while litigation on others is pending).
44. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 500, 816 P.2d at 1312, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (emphasizing that issues of great
public importance should be resolved promptly, supporting the appropriateness of the California Supreme Court's
assertion of original jurisdiction).
45. See id. (justifying departure from the court's usual course because the petition involved the validity of
a statewide initiative).
46. See U at 506, 816 P.2d at 1316,286 Cal. Rptr. at 290 (holding that Proposition 140 imposed lifetime
term limits).
47. It appears likely that individual legislators strategically asserted that Proposition 140 imposed a lifetime
ban, instead of a limit on consecutive terms, in order to present the measure as a ballot access case which
traditionally triggered a strict scrutiny analysis instead of a less demanding rational basis analysis. See Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (invalidating a state statute using a strict scrutiny
analysis which made it virtually impossible for a new party to obtain a place on the ballot, thus impairing
individuals' right to associate and voters' rights to cast their votes effectively). But see Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780,788 (1983) (providing that states may impose burdens on candidates' eligibility for the ballot without
presenting constitutionally suspect burdens on voters).
48. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 504, 816 P.2d at 1315,286 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (providing that the petitioners refer
to language in the initiative which stresses a broad intent to eliminate "career politicians," while respondents focus
on a narrower interpretation of the measure's language wherein an incumbent "Senator" or a "member of the
Assembly," rather than a "person," is limited to continue consecutive terms in office).
49. See id at 506, 816 P.2d at 1316,286 Cal. Rptr. at 290 (holding that Proposition 140 impozes a lifetime
ban on officeholders after serving the prescribed maximum number of terms).
50. See id. at 504-06, 816 P.2d at 1315-16, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90 (rejecting a literal interpretation of
Proposition 140 which would only prohibit a "Senator" or "Assemblymember" from seeking reelection after the
prescribed number of terms, because such a reading would circumvent the intent of the measure by allowing
Senators and Assemblymembers to resign from their respective office and seek reelection without the status of
Senator or Assemblymember).
51. Id at 504, 816 P.2d at 1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (quoting Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245, 250, 806 P.2d 1360, 1363, 279 Cal. RpM. 325, 328 (1991)); id. (providing that
examples of such indicia include the analysis and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet); id.
(recognizing that to help resolve ambiguities in a measure enacted through the initiative process, a court may
consider indicia of the voters' intent in addition to the language of the provision itself).
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the proponents and voters who supported Proposition 140.52 Despite the absence of
express language in the initiative or the analysis by the independent Legislative
Analyst 53 indicating that Proposition 140 contemplated a lifetime ban, the court

drew support from the opponents' ballot arguments which repeatedly stressed that
the measure imposes a lifetime ban and highlighted the proponents' deceptive

failure to disclose this aspect of the measure in their arguments.' Because
opponents frequently overstate adverse impacts of a measure, they are not highly
authoritative in interpreting a measure.55 However, the California Supreme Court
found it significant that the proponents failed to contradict or rebut the opponents'
lifetime ban argument. 56 Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court held
that it was likely the average voter understood that the measure imposed a lifetime
ban against incumbents seeking reelection once the prescribed maximum number

of terms had been served.57
Although Proposition 140 was enacted as an amendment to the California
Constitution, its provisions must also comport with the Federal Constitution. 58 In
Eu, the California Supreme Court relied upon the analysis of the United States
Supreme Court in analyzing constitutional challenges to election laws. 59 The court

52. See id. (indicating that the independent Legislative Analyst analysis in the ballot pamphlet described
the term limitations as limiting "the number of terms that an elected state official can serve in the same office");
see also MARcH FONG Eu, BALLOT PAMPHLET, PROPOSED STATUTES AND AMENDMENTS TO CALIFORNIA

CONSTrTmoN WrrH ARGUMENT TO VOTERS, GENERAL ELECriON 69 (Nov. 6, 1990) [hereinafter BALLOT
PAMPHLET] (indicating that the Legislative Analyst's analysis did not suggest that only a consecutive term
limitation is contemplated).
53. See BALLOT PAMPHLErsupra note 52, at 69 (stating that the initiative "limits the number of terms that
an elected state official can serve in the same office" without specifically stating that a lifetime ban or consecutive
terms are contemplated). But see CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9085(b) (West 1996) (providing that summary statements
prepared by the Legislative Analyst are not intended to provide comprehensive information on each measure); cf
Kelso, supranote 43, at 345 (pointing out that a legislative analysis is not constitutionally required nor does it have
any constitutional significance in the passage of voter initiatives).
54. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 505, 816 P.2d at 1315,286 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (indicating the speculative nature of
opponents' "fears and doubts" regarding a measure's adverse effects); see also DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 495 U.S. 568, 585 (1988) (dismissing the authoritative value of the fears
and doubts expressed by the opponents in the construction of legislation).
55. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 505, 816 P.2d at 1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (recognizing that the 'Years and
doubts" expressed by ballot measure opponents should not be granted great weight in construing a measure).
56. See id.
(emphasizing that proponents reinforced the intent ofa lifetime ban by stressing that Proposition
140 sought to eliminate "career legislators" without foreclosing the opportunity of "good legislators" from seeking
other political offices by "mov[ing] up the ladder"); see also BALLOT PAMPHLET, supranote 52, at 70 (asserting
that "[l]imiting terms, [sic] will create more competitive elections, so good legislators will always have the
opportunity to move up the ladder").
57. See Eu,54 Cal. 3d at 505, 816 P.2d at 1316,286 Cal. Rptr. at290 (taking into account the measure's
language and other relevant material).
58. See id. at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (indicating that in determining the validity of an
amendment to a state constitution it is appropriate to look to U.S. Supreme Court decisions for guidance); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that "an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void").
59. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (noting that the Supreme Court
traditionally analyzes the constitutionality of election laws under the Equal Protection Clause).
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prefaced its analysis by noting the difficulty presented by constitutional challenges
to specific provisions of state election laws because of the absence of any "litmuspaper test '6 to provide a distinction between valid and invalid restrictions. 61 While
the United States Supreme Court has generally addressed the validity of election
regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 62 "the
'
standard of review utilized in voting and election cases has been in a state of flux."63
Petitioners claimed that Proposition 140's lifetime ban burdened their fundamental
rights to vote and to be candidates for public office. 64
The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally provided the states broad discretion
in the adoption of laws governing the election process, even if such laws limit the
electorate's selection of their representatives, provided that the laws are applied in
a non-discriminatory and even-handed manner. 65 In Eu, the court addressed
petitioners' First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the Federal Constitution
by applying the standard of review adopted from Anderson v. Celebrezze.66 In
Anderson, the Court required the consideration of three separate elements in
resolving constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a state's election laws. 67
First, the court must consider "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff

60. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789-90 (1983) (setting forth the test which requires the
Court: (1)to consider the type and extent of the harm to the plaintiff, against the impact to the protected rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) to identify and assess the interests presented by the state that outweigh
the burden resulting from the implementation of its regulation; (3) to weigh and balance the compelling nature of
the state interests presented; and (4) to weigh the extent which the state interests justify the burden placed on the
plaintiff's rights).
61. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 516,816 P.2d at 1323,286 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (recognizing that courts must engage
in considerable evaluation and balancing which does not yield automatic results).
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I
(No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.).
63. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515,816 P.2d at 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
64. See itt at 514, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (implicating petitioners' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights).
65. See id.
at 516,816 P.2d at 1323,286 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (granting broad authority to the states in enacting
election laws); see also Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (stating that the Federal
Constitution fails to require procedures for states to follow when filling legislative vacancies).
66. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). The petitioners urged the use of a strict-scrutiny standard in analyzing Proposition
140 relying on Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 222-25 (1989) (invalidating a ban on
political party endorsements because it burdened appellees' rights to free speech and free association, without
serving a compelling government interest). However, Proposition 140, unlike San Francisco Democratic
Committee, does not seriously impact the First Amendment freedoms of speech and associations because it equally
impacts all political parties. Eu,54 Cal. 3d at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296. Moreover, the Eu court
noted that applying strict scrutiny to Proposition 140 would not have yielded a different result. Id. at 515, 816 P.2d
at 1323, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
67. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789-90 (setting forth the factors a court must weigh in determining whether
a challenged election law provision is unconstitutional); see also Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 517, 816 P.2d at 1323, 286 Cal,
Rptr. at 297 (articulating the test to be met to justify the "necessity" of the burden imposed by the State).
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seeks to vindicate."8 Second, the court must characterize and weigh the interest
presented by the State and determine if the interest outweighs the burden imposed
by the regulation.' Third, as the court contemplates the legitimacy of the rule, in
addition to considering the State's necessity for imposing the particular burden
affecting the plaintiff's rights, "it must also consider the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights," rather than some less
drastic alternative.70 Finally, the State's interest must be both legitimate and
necessary to outweigh any burden on the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.7 '
Applying these factors, the California Supreme Court held that while
Proposition 140 impacts the rights of voters and candidates, the impact is
sufficiently mitigated by the fact that voters may continue to vote for any qualified
candidates, office-seekers are able to serve a significant time in office, and
candidates may also seek other public offices.72 Additionally, the court held that the
State's interests in limiting incumbency are compelling and well recognized.73 The
relevant State interests that the California Supreme Court cited included: the power
of incumbent officeholders to develop unfair incumbent advantages with various
groups and networks,7 a desire to prevent the development of "entrenched political
machines,"'
returning widespread access to the political process, 76 and
reinvigorating electorate participation.' The court concluded that the lifetime ban

68.
69.
70.
interests).
71.
legitimate
policy).
72.

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789-90.
See id. (indicating that the State's interest must outweigh the burden imposed on the plaintiff).
See id. at 806 (asserting that less drastic alternatives must be considered to achieve the State's necessary
See Eu, 54 Cal.3d at 520, 816 P.2d at 1326, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (stating that incumbency reform is a
state interest, and preventing incumbents from perpetuating their incumbency serves a rational public
See id. at 519, 816 P.2d at 1325, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 299 (indicating an uncertainty of the legal impact of

Proposition 140 on voters because federal law was unclear whether voters retain a constitutional right to vote for
particular candidates).
73. See id. at 520,816 P.2d at 1326,286 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (relying on State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney,
223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1976), which provided that twenty state constitutions have restricted the ability of
incumbents to succeed themselves, and the Twenty-Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
also limits the number of terms an individual may serve as President); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1
(stating that an individual may not be elected President more than twice).
74. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 521,816 P.2d at 1326,286 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
75. Id.; see ld. (illustrating that the presence of an entrenched political machine might discourage and
intimidate other candidates from challenging incumbents, which could effectively foreclose access to the political
process).
76. See id. (predicting that a regular disruption of the political machinery would stimulate discussion within
political parties and facilitate electorate participation).
77. Id.; see id. (asserting that limiting incumbents' ability to succeed themselves would foster an
environment which encourages political participation instead of ambivalence because policies that are unfavorable
to various minorities are more likely to thrive in an environment where those in power "can rely upon electorate
inertia fostered by the hopelessness of encountering a seemingly invincible political machine"). While "Maloney
involved a limitation on consecutive terms for a Governor, rather than a lifetime ban on incumbent legislators," the
court in Eu noted that the state interests expressed in Maloney "would apply with equal force to the legislative
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on candidacy was necessary to accomplish the spirit of Proposition 140, which
sought to eliminate a class of career politicians7 s created and fostered by the unfair
incumbent advantages 9 outlined in the constitutional amendment." In imposing
lifetime bans on state legislators, the court dismissed various, less drastic
alternatives, including a limitation on consecutive terms that which require a
legislator to take one term off before being eligible to run for the same office."' The
court concluded that a consecutive term limit would not effectively eliminate the
significant incumbent advantages developed while in office, and that incumbent
advantages could be substantially "reinvoke[d] 8' 2 by individuals even after leaving

office for a period of time in their efforts to seek reelection.83
One of the many substantial advantages an incumbent possesses over
challenging candidates is name recognition among the voters in his or her district
An incumbent is in a betterposition to facilitate increased name recognition through
natural media opportunities involving the formulation of public policy and issues
of public interest generated by virtue of his or her incumbent status. 85 Accordingly,
the court held that "only a lifetime ban could protect against various kinds of
continued exploitation of the 'advantages of incumbency' captured through past
terms in office."8 6 In balancing the three elements, the court concluded that "the
interests of the state in incumbency reform outweigh any injury to incumbent office
holders and those who would vote for them."8 7 Additionally, the court buttressed its
conclusion by stating that voters do not possess a fundamental right to vote for

branch." Id at 521, 816 P.2d at 1326,286 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
78. See CAL CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.5 (incorporating Proposition 140's preamble to state the initiative's
purpose).
79. See Eu,54 Cal. 3d at 523, 816 P.2d at 1327, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (referring to "incumbent advantages"
which compromise California's electoral system such as "superior fund raising ability, greater media coverage...
and greater name recognition among the voters").
80. Id.
81. Id.; see id. (indicating that less drastic alternatives to a lifetime ban would have been inadequate to
eliminate unfair incumbent advantages); see also CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.5 (expressing the purpose of Proposition

140).
82. Eu,54 Cal. 3d at 523, 816 P.2d at 1328,286 Cal. Rptr. at 302; see id. (emphasizing that a lifetime ban
was necessary to disable incumbents from capitalizing on the advantages which they developed while in office).
83. See id. at 523, 816 P.2d at 1327,286 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (listing greater name recognition as an incumbent
advantage over other candidates).
84. Id.; see id. (stating other incumbent advantages including superior fundraising ability, larger and more
experienced staffs, and favorably drawn voting districts); see also Einer Elhauge et al., How Term Limits Enhance
the Expression of Democratic Preferences, S. SUP. Cr. ECON. REV. 59, 67 (1977) (hypothesizing that an
incumbent's "brand name" makes him or her more marketable than a challenger).
85. See Einer Elhauge et al., supra note 84, at 67 (illustrating greater media coverage as an incumbent
advantage over other candidates).
86. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 524, 816 P.2d at 1328, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 302; see Elhauge et al., supranote 84, at 69
(asserting that "to the extent that term limits reduce the average tenure of incumbents, the average amount of name
recognition held by incumbents will be smaller and the disadvantage that must be overcome in a race against an
incumbent is reduced").
87. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 524, 816 P.2d at 1328,286 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
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particular candidates. 8 Thus, Proposition 140's lifetime ban does not impose any
serious impact on First or Fourteenth Amendment rights; rather, it "impacts all
political parties on an equal basis."8 9 Summarizing the state's legitimate and

compelling interests in enacting the lifetime ban prescribed by the measure, the
court held that the state's interests outweighed "the narrower interests of the
petitioner legislators and the constituents who wish to perpetuate their

incumbency. '' 0
2. League of Women Voters v. Diamond
Subsequent to the decision reached in Eu, the United States District Court in
Maine decided League of Women Voters v. Diamond,9 1 which also addressed the
issue of state imposed term limits through the initiative process. 2 In Diamond,the
court analyzed whether a 1993 state ballot initiative,93 which imposed term limits
on various state officials, violated, inter alia, plaintiffs' state and federal
constitutional rights. 94 State legislators, voters, and others ("plaintiffs") sought
preliminary injunctive relief to prevent the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General ("defendants") from enforcing the provisions of the Term Limitations Act
of 199395 ("the Act"). 9 The Act limited state senators and representatives to four

88. See id. at 524. 816 P.2d at 1328. 286 Cal. Rptr. at 302 (indicating that Supreme Court decisions have
held that voters do not have the right to vote for particular candidates); see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
439 (1992) (holding that a state's ban on write-in voting was a limited burden).
89. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515,816 P.2d at 1323,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
90. 1d at 525, 816 P.2d at 1329,286 Cal. Rptr. at 303; see also Nevada Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 910 P.2d 898,
902 (Nev. 1996) (upholding a voter initiative which approved a lifetime ban on members of the judiciary after
serving two terms as necessary to address the initiative's aims of changing the composition of the judiciary).
91. 923 F. Supp. 266 (D. Me. 1996).
92. Unlike Eu, which imposed state term limits through a constitutional amendment, Diamond sought to
impose term limits through an initiative bill. See Diamond, 923 F. Supp. at 267 (indicating the legislative channel
term limits were pursued by the state); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 553(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1997)
(providing the measure that was adopted through initiative bill I.B.1, rather than through the legislature).
93.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.21-A, § 553(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1997).

94. See Diamond, 923 F. Supp. at 268 (asserting that the Term Limitations Act of 1993 unconstitutionally
violates plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and association).
95. See id. (describing the nature of the relief sought by plaintiffs); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A
§ 553(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1997) (appearing as the'Term Limitations Act of 1993" on the November 2,1993 Maine
ballot).
96. See Diamond, 923 F. Supp. at 268 (presenting two theories to present enforcement: (1) the Act violates
plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and association under the United States
Constitution; and (2) the Act's legislative attempt to impose additional qualifications on state officeholders without
seeking a constitutional amendment violates the Maine Constitution).
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consecutive terms.97 In December 1993, the Act became law and applied to
nominations and ballots printed after January 1, 1996.98
Placing Diamond'sconsecutive term limits measure in context, the court noted
that "all state election laws in some capacity burden candidates' and voters' First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights." 99 The court must balance the state's legitimate
regulatory interests against First Amendment rights, such as freedom of expression
and association, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to participate on an equal basis
with other voters in the election of their representatives." The court will strictly
scrutinize election laws which impose a "severe burden" on these rights, such as
those that are "content-based or overly ballot preclusive," presenting unreasonable
barriers for individuals seeking access to the ballot as candidates. 01
Alternatively, the court relied on the test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Anderson v. Celebrezze °2 The test in Anderson requires courts to balance the
magnitude of the asserted injury to a plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights against the precise interests asserted by the state tojustify the burden imposed
by its rule.'0 3
The standard in Anderson was further developed by the Supreme Court in
Burdick v. Takushi.14 In Burdick, the Supreme Court established that a severe
restriction to plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights subjects the election
law to strict scrutiny,'05 while a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction subjects

97. See id,(indicating that the bill was passed by the initiative process to impose limits on the number of
consecutive terms various state officials could serve); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN.tit. 21-A, § 553(1)-(2) (West
Supp. 1997) ("A person may not serve more than 4 consecutive terms as a state Senator. A person may not serve
more than 4 consecutive terms as a member of the state House of Representatives.").
98. See Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 268 (providing a background and phase-in date of the Act); see also ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 554 (West Supp. 1997) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who
is prohibited from service in an office as set forth in section 553 may not be nominated to that offie.... This
section applies to nominations occurring and ballots printed after January 1, 1996.").
99. Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 271.
100. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (holding that restricting access of political parties to
the ballot impinges upon individuals' rights to associate for political purposes, and "the right of qualified voters
... to cast their votes effectively"); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-30 (1974) (explaining that
associational rights are not absolute and are subject to qualification if necessary to fairly and effectively run
elections); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (emphasizing that the right of suffrage is fundamental
in a democratic society).
101. See Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 271 (providing that the Act merely limits the consecutive number ofterms
a candidate may serve without foreclosing running for their prior office after a one term waiting period, and without
permanently limiting the field of candidates from which voters may choose).
102. 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789-90 (outlining the factors of the Court's balancing
test).
103. See id. at 789 (indicating the analytical nature of the test).
104. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
105. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; see Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992) (setting forth the strict
scrutiny standard which must be overcome when a state action severely burdens individuals' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by limiting access to the ballot: the State must set forth a compelling interest to justify the
limitation, and the limitation must be narrowly drawn to advance the state interest). But see Burdick, 504 U.S. at
434 (providing only a rational basis standard that must be overcome, and that is generally met when a state election
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the law to a less rigorous analysis under Anderson.06 A careful reading of Burdick
provides guidance as to when a state election restriction moves from legitimate to
severe."° The two key factors to consider include: "(1) whether the restriction is
content-based °8 or content-neutral; 1°9 and (2) the extent to which alternative routes
to ballot access minimize the restriction on the plaintiffs' rights."' 0 A state's

election system that creates barriers limiting the field of candidates does not by
itself compel strict scrutiny."' In Burdick, the Court held that "when a state election
law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the
important regulatory
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State's
' 12
restrictions."
the
justify
to
sufficient
generally
are
interests
This finding was made in light of the test set forth by Anderson-Burdick, and
after determining that consecutive terms limits on a state legislator were neither
content-based nor overly ballot preclusive, but rather content-neutral. 4 The
district court then concluded that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits that the Act imposes a severe burden on their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights." With respect to state constitutional claims, the
court similarly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of
success on the merits. 11 6 Accordingly, defendants were relieved from the obligation

law imposes reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions which serve an important regulatory interest, but which
nevertheless impact voters' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
106. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; see Diamond, 923 F. Supp. at 269 (emphasizing that any election measure that
limits the field of candidates by creating barriers, by itself does not subject the measure to strict scrutiny).
107. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (providing that while the Court did not expressly provide when an election
law restriction moves from reasonable to severe, two key indicators were isolated).
108. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94 (1983) (providing that a state election law which
unequally burdens new or small political parties or independent candidates would be characterized as contentbased); see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1974) (striking down a state election law imposing high
candidate filing fees as unconstitutional because the economic burden would disproportionately effect the less
affluent members of the community, whose candidates would be less likely to afford the cost to become a
candidate).
109. Burdick 504 U.S. at 428;see id. (including reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions ascontent-neutral);
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782 (affining a state election law which imposed a filing period deadine on candidates
seeking to appear on the ballot); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (upholding a state
statute allowing interim vacancies of elected offices to be filled without a special election, and in some cases by
appointment, until the next regularly scheduled election, as applicable to all legislative vacancies).
110. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428 (providing that ample access to the primary ballot is available until the
cutoff date for the filing of nominating petitions).
111. See id. at 433 (cautioning that a more flexible standard applies).
112. Id. at 434.
113. See Diamond, 923 F. Supp. at 271 (referring to the minimal impact the measure would have on
plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
114. See id at270 (indicating that no distinction among candidates is made on the basis ofwealth, race, party
affiliation or ideology).
115. See id. at 268-70 (stating that the plaintiffs' claims that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
free speech and association are violated by the Act do not constitute a severe burden, nor do they rise to the level
of strict scrutiny which would establish a likelihood of success on the merits).
116. See id at 272 (disallowing plaintiffs' allegation that the Act impermissibly adds qualifications for office
to those set forth in the Maine Constitution).
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of justifying the Act with a compelling state interest.117 Instead, the defendants
needed only to present an important regulatory interest to overcome the burden of

the restriction on the plaintiffs' rights."' Defendants offered several important
regulatory interests which outweighed the plaintiffs' asserted injury to their First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 1 9 The court was satisfied that many of the
interests that defendants presented were both legitimate and strong, including
defendants' intent to reduce unfair advantages enjoyed by incumbents at the polls
and to promote fairer and more competitive elections. 20
The Diamondcourt concluded that because the Act results in a flat ban on every

incumbent in the Maine legislature, and the number of consecutive terms he or she

1 22
may serve, 21 the Act could not be accurately described as content-based.

Additionally it established that the Act did not establish a lifetime ban on termedout incumbents, but ratheraban against consecutivelimits."2 Seeking to distinguish
its holding in Diamond,which imposed consecutive term limits on state legislators,
with Bates v. Jones,1 24 which imposed a lifetime ban on state legislators, the Maine

District Court highlighted that the burden the Act imposes is not severe.2 "The
Act, however, merely limits the consecutive number of terms a candidate may

117. See id. (stating that when state election laws impose only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions"
upon voters' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, "the state's important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify the restrictions"); see also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (providing that the regulatory interests
of a state generally justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions which affect an individual's right to vote and
associate).
118. See Diamond, 923 F. Supp. at 272 (indicating that when a severe burden is not established by the
plaintiffs, the state's threshold is lowered from presenting a compelling state interest to merely advancing the need
of an important regulatory restriction).
119. Id. The court noted that the defendants identified six interests which were served by term limits:
(1) reducing unfair advantages enjoyed by incumbents at the polls; (2) promoting fairer and more
competitive elections; (3) encouraging qualified new candidates to run for public office; (4) dislodging
entrenched political leadership; (5) curbing the power of political machines; and (6) encouraging the
election of citizen representatives instead of career politicians intent on their own reelection.
Id.
120. See id. (listing the first two regulatory interests advanced by the states).
121. See Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 270 (establishing that the Act fails to characterize or advocate a preference
among the ideologies presented to the electors); see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 (upholding a flat ban on write-in
ballots as content-neutral).
122. See Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 270 (noting that the Act results in a flat ban and does not differentiate or
limit the range of political ideas from which voters may select their representatives); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21-A, § 553(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1997) (codifying an initiative bill, 1.B., passed in 1993 by Maine voters, which
imposed limits on the number of consecutive terms various state officials could serve including state senators and
representatives).
123. See Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 270 (stating that incumbents must sit out for one term, after which they
may seek their prior office); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 553 (West Supp. 1997) (setting forth the
limitations on consecutive terms in office).
124. 958F.Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Bates states that California's Proposition 140 imposed lifetime term
limits on state legislators of two terms for state senators and three terms for state representatives. Id. at 1085.
125. See Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 271 (asserting that limiting consecutive terms of legislators is less severe
than lifetime term limits on legislators).
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serve," 126 without foreclosing any opportunity to seek both other offices and even
-to return to his or her prior office after waiting one term. 7 The court's decision was
29
influenced by an advisory opinion" of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,1
which concluded that the limitations imposed by the Act fell within the legislative
power, and if enacted would be constitutionally valid.' 30
While the Maine District Court was deciding Diamond, and following the
Opinion of the Justices, the United States Supreme Court decided its first term
limits case, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.'3' Thornton involved a challenge to
a state law which imposed term limits on members of Congress. 32 Hopeful for
some guidance on the issue, but ultimately unpersuaded by the applicability of
Thornton, the court in Diamondheld that, "[i]n the absence of any direct authority
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine on the issue ....
the advisory opinion of
the Justices provides the best forecast of how the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
would evaluate [the] state constitutional issue Plaintiffs raise.' 33 Accordingly, the
court relied on the advisory opinion of the Justices, which directly addressed the
issue of state imposed consecutive term limits on state legislators in weighing the
plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits of their claim.i 34

126. lId
127. See id. (stating that a termed out incumbent must wait one term before he or she may again run for his
or her prior office).
128. See Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693,695 (Me. 1996) (providing that advisory opinions are issued
pursuant to Maine Constitution article VI, section 3, and such opinions are not binding upon the state supreme
court); id. at 1261 (articulating that advisory opinions will be issued only when important questions of law which
pertain to "instant" matters are involved).
129. See Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 271 (preceding the submission ofthe Act to the voters, the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in response to the Maine House of Representatives, issued an advisory opinion
on the constitutionality of the Act under the Maine Constitution).
130. See Opinion of the Justices,673 A.2d at 695 (reasoning that the qualifications enumerated in the Maine
Constitution allow the legislature to prescribe additional conditions for representatives or senators, provided the
added qualifications are reasonable, do not conflict with the Constitution, and do not violate any guaranteed rights).
131. 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (5-4 decision); see infra Part II.B (providing a more extensive discussion of
Thornton); see also Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 273 (indicating that, in Thornton, the Court struck down a portion
of an Arkansas law which imposed term limits on members of the United States House of Representatives and
Senate, while clearly stating its decisions did not extend to state law issues).
132. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 783 (describing a challenge to an amendment to the Arkansas State
Constitution prohibiting the name of a candidate for Congress from appearing on the ballot if the candidate has
already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the U.S. Senate).
133. Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 273.
134. See id. (stating that the court relied less on 77orntonand more on the Advisory Opinion of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine in interpreting the Maine Constitution because the Advisory Opinion dealt directly with
the state constitutional question raised by the plaintiffs).
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3. Summary of State Term Limits Cases
States may impose term limit restrictions on state legislators without violating

the Federal Constitution. 135 The California Supreme Court in Legislature v. Eu
upheld Proposition 140 which imposed a lifetime ban on state legislators.' 36 In
Diamond,the United States District Court upheld a Maine ballot initiative, which
imposed limits on the number of consecutive terms state officials could serve.137
Thus, whether a measure imposes a lifetime ban, consecutive term limits, or other
forms of term limits and whether the case is heard in state or federal court, courts
reach the same conclusion: imposing term limits on state legislators is within a
state's authority.
B. Federal Term Limits Cases
In 1995, the Supreme Court for the first time decided a case involving term
limits, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.138 In Thornton, an action was brought
challenging Amendment 73139 to the Arkansas Constitution, which precluded

persons who had served a certain number of terms in the United States Congress
from having their names placed on the ballot for election to Congress. 140 In a

divided opinion,141 the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Circuit Court
and the Arkansas Supreme Court, which both held that the amendment violated the

135. See Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp. 1446, 1454 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (listing fourteen states that have
adopted consecutive or other forms of term limits); infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (providing examples
of state imposed term limits which have been upheld); see, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 21 (four consecutive
terms); COLO.CONST. art. V. § 3 (four consecutive terms in lower house, two consecutive terms in upper house);
MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (eight years within preceding sixteen years); see also supranote 19 and accompanying
text (listing six states in addition to California that have enacted lifetime term limits on legislative service).
136. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 501, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 287 (1991)
(holding that Proposition 140 is constitutionally valid, with the exception of the pension restrictions pertaining to
incumbent legislators).
137. See Diamond,923 F. Supp. at 267 (denying amotion for preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement
of a consecutive term limits initiative affecting state officials approved by Maine voters).
138. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
139. Proposed as a 'Term Limit Amendment," its preamble states:
The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in office too long
become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the people. Entrenched
incumbency has reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less
competitive, and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the
people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein limit the terms of elected officials.
ARK CONST. amend. 73, preamble.
140. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 784 (clarifying that section 3 of amendment 73 applies to Arkansas'
Congressional Delegation, which denies individuals that have been elected to three or more terms in Congress the
opportunity to seek reelection).
141. The opinion was delivered by Justice Stevens, in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
joined. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined.
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United States Constitution.1 42 The Court held that the amendment was an indirect
attempt to evade the Qualifications Clauses' 43requirements,'44 and undermined the
basic democratic principles underlying those clauses. 45
Relying on Powell v. McCormack " 6the Thornton Court specifically held that:
(1) States may not impose qualifications for the office of the United States
representative in addition to those set forth by the Constitution; (2) the Tenth
Amendment does not reserve to the states the power to set additional qualifications;
and (3) a state provision which has the likely effect of handicapping a class of
candidates with the sole purpose of indirectly creating additional qualifications is
unconstitutional. 47 The Court concluded that state imposed restrictions on
qualifications for Congress violated the idea "that the right to choose
representatives belongs not to the States, but to the people."'1' Thus, expressing a
concern that if individual states were permitted to independently determine
qualifications for their representatives, a "patchwork" of qualifications would result
among the states, "undermining the uniformity
and the national character that the
'1 49
Framers envisioned and sought to ensure.
The holding in Thornton is consistent with state and lower federal courts that
have held that Powell conclusively established that Congress does not have the
power to impose additional qualifications on Representatives."5° The Supreme Court

142. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 783-85 (explaining that the Arkansas Supreme Court issued a 5-2 decision
concluding that states may not alter the requirements for congressional service enumerated in the Qualifications
Clauses).
143. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (providing the qualifications for members of the House of
Representatives, which require reaching the age of twenty-five and United States citizenship for seven years); id.
art I, § 3, cl. 3 (specifying the qualifications for Senate members).
144. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 831 (indicating that amendments which erect barriers foraclass ofcandidates
with the purpose or effect of circumventing the requirements of the Qualifications Clauses will not be upheld).
145. See id. (emphasizing that "allowing States to evade the Qualifications Clauses by 'dressing eligibility
to stand for Congress in ballot access clothing' trivializes the basic principles of our democracy that underlie those
Clauses"); see also id. at 792 (mentioning that the Supreme Court reviewed the debates at the state conventions and
found that they confirmed "the Framers' understanding that the qualifications for members of Congress had been
fixed in the Constitution") (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 540 (1969)).
146. 395 U.S. 486 (1969); see id at 522 (holding that the Constitution does not grant Congress the authority
to exclude any person who is elected by his or her constituents and meets all the constitutionally prescribed
requirements for membership); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, 3 (listing the qualifications requirements for
a member of Congress). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (providing that each House shall judge the
qualifications of its members).
147. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 779.
148. Id. at 820-21.
149. Id. at 822.
150. See id. at 798 (asserting that based on historical analysis, the qualifications for service in Congress set
forth in the Constitution are "fixed" and are not subject to additional qualifications by Congress); see, e.g., Stumpf
v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 122 (Nev. 1992) (citing Powell for the proposition that even Congress did not have the power
to alter qualifications for constitutional federal officers); State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 197 P.2d 864, 869 (Wyo.
1948) (following a detailed historical analysis, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the State and Federal
Constitutional Qualifications Clauses are exclusive); see also Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Term Limits, The State
Courts,and NationalDominion: The Vicissitudes of American Federalism,60 ALB. L. REV. 1567, 1578 (1997)
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concluded in Thornton that changes or additions to the Qualifications Clause must

be pursued through a constitutional amendment.151 The Court also rejected the claim
that Amendment 73 is a valid exercise of state power under the Elections Clause,"5 2
which delegates authority to the states to regulate elections of members of
Representatives and Senators. 5 3 The Elections Clause should be construed to grant
states the authority to regulate the proceduralaspects of the election process, such
as promoting efficiency and protecting the integrity of the election process, rather
than to allow states to impose substantivequalifications, which may exclude classes
of candidates from seeking federal office."
The decision in Thornton involved federal, not state, law issues.15 Thus, the
Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of whether a state could impose
term limits on state legislators. Instead, the Court left the issue open leaving lower
courts to wrestle with the issue presented in Bates.
Im.

BATES V. JONES'5

A. The Facts
California proposed and adopted its term limits through the state's initiative
process.' On November 6, 1990, California voters approved Proposition 140 by
a margin of 52.17% to 47.83%. 58 However, five years after California voters passed
Proposition 140 and four years following the California Supreme Court's decision

(affirming Justice Stevens' support for the proposition that states may not make additions to the Qualifications
Clauses requirements for Representatives and Senators).
151. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 783 (declaring that any changes in the qualifications expressed in the
Constitution must be enacted through the amendment process).
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I (providing that states may regulate the times, places and manner of
holding elections).
153. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 796 (concluding that the Supreme Court in Powell held that Congress may
not alter the qualifications of its members as expressed in the Constitution).
154. See id. at 832-33 (stating that a broad construction of the Elections Clause allowing states to make or
alter the qualifications of members of Congress is inconsistent with the Framers' intent).

155. See Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 868 (9th Cir. 1997) (Sneed, J., dissenting) (declaring that Thornton
does not provide support for the argument that Proposition 140's term limits on state legislators are unconstitutional,
because Thornton addresses state imposed term limits on federal officeholders).
156. For the purpose of clarification, the remainder of this Comment will refer to the Northern District Court
of California decision of Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1997), as Bates L The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals first review of Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1997), will be referred to as Bates 1I. The Ninth
Circuit's en banc review of Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997), will be called Bates Il.
157. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 52, at 137 (providing the text of Proposition 140).
158. Bates 1, 958 F. Supp. 1446, 1455 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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in Eu, which held that Proposition 140's lifetime ban on state legislators was
valid,' 59 the constitutional validity of Proposition 140 was challenged again.' 60
In Eu, the California Supreme Court evaluated the challenge to Proposition 140
solely on the briefs and papers submitted by the parties, lacking a lower
court's
16
examination of the merits of the parties' legal or factual contentions. 1
Proposition 140, in relevant part, proposed to amend the California
constitutional provision governing legislators by adding language providing that
Senators would be limited to two four-year terms in office, and Assemblymembers
would be limited to three two-year terms in office.' 62 Additionally, the Proposition
included a preamble providing that the purpose of the measure was to eliminate
incumbent advantages and promote more competitive elections. 63
Between 1977 and 1996, Plaintiff Tom Bates represented the area comprising
the current 14th Assembly District.164 After nearly two decades of public service in
the California Legislature, Bates was unable to seek reelection in 1996 because
Proposition 140 limited the number of terms an Assemblymember could serve.' 65

159. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 525, 816 P.2d 1309, 1329, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 303 (1991)
(upholding the constitutionality of Proposition 140).
160. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9000-9125 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the general procedures and
framework involved in pursuing legislation through the initiative process).
161. See Bates 1, 958 F. Supp. at 1455 (indicating that no trial was held). In contrast to Eu, the District Court
in Bates I conducted a full trial from October 15 to October 24, 1996. The findings of fact and conclusions of law
were made pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (providing that
in actions tried upon the facts without a jury the court shall find the facts and state separately its conclusions of
law).
162. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (setting forth the term limits for Senators and Assemblymembers).
163. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.5 (setting forth the preamble to the initiative).
The people find and declare that the Founding Fathers established a system of representative
government based upon free, fair, and competitive elections. The increased concentration of political
power in the hands of incumbent representatives has made our electoral system less free, less
competitive, and less representative.
The ability of legislators to serve unlimited number of terms, to establish their own retirement
system, and to pay for staff and support services at state expense contribute heavily to the extremely
high number of incumbents who are reelected. These unfair incumbent advantages discourage qualified
candidates from seeking public office and create a class of career politicians, instead of the citizen
representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers. These career politicians become representatives of
the bureaucracy, rather than of the people whom they are elected to represent.
To restore a free and democratic system of fair elections, and to encourage 4ualified candidates
to seek public office, the people find and declare that the powers of incumbency must be limited.
Retirement benefits must be restricted, state-financed incumbent staff and support services limited, and
limitations placed upon the number of terms which may be served.
Id
164. See Bates 1, 958 F. Supp. at 1456 (stating that due to reapportionment, the boundaries of the 14th
Assembly District have changed, but have generally included the city of Berkeley and adjoining neighborhoods).
165. See CAL CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (providing that Assemblymembers were limited to three terms); Bates
1, 958 F. Supp. at 1456 (acknowledging that Proposition 140 effectively barred Bates from seeking reelection to
the State Assembly).

1998/Bates v. Jones-Lifetime Term Limits

Several voters in the 14th Assembly District were also named as plaintiffs.'6 The
voter plaintiffs expressed that their support for Assemblyman Bates was derived

from the Assemblyman's exceptional representation, his unique qualifications, and
his valuable legislative experience.' 67 Former Assemblyman Bates and some of his
supporters in the 14th Assembly District sought to enjoin enforcement of
California's term limits so Bates could seek re-election to the Assembly in 1996.161
Several other plaintiff legislators, and voters in their respective districts, were also
parties to the suit.' 69 Together the parties
challenged the constitutionality of
70
Proposition 140's lifetime term limits.
B. The DistrictCourt
The United States District Court in California, similar to the California Supreme
72
7
Court in Eu, also applied the test set forth in Anderson, 1 as modified by Burdick.1
Traditionally, the Anderson-Burdicktest has been applied to "ballot access" cases,
which generally involve challenges to laws that govern the procedures and
eligibility requirements for political parties or candidates appearing on the ballot.'73
However, in an effort to distinguish Bates,the district court concluded that the term
limits imposed by Proposition 140 did not merely limit access to the ballot, but

166. See Bates!, 958 F. Supp. at 1456 (naming Jonathan Browning, Lawrence Buchalter, Ardis Graham,
Richard Lewis, Edward Lyman, Rachel Sherman, and Richard Sterling as voter plaintiffs from the 14th Assembly
District).
167. See id. (observing that Bates was unusually concerned with and effective at representing the interests
of the voter plaintiffs, including: the needs of low-income and disabled citizens and environmental protection).
168. See id at 1452 (providing that if Bates was successful in enjoining enforcement of Proposition 140, he
would seek an eleventh term in the Assembly).
169. See id at 1456-57 (indicating that plaintiff legislators included: Assemblywoman Martha Eacutia,
Assemblywoman Barbara Friedman; plaintiff voters included: Sylvia Hernandez, Ana Rosa Pena, Claudia Navar,
Susan Zarakov, Harriet Brown Sculley).
170. See id at 1451 (stating in the introduction that the court must address the question of whether lifetime
legislative term limits provisions of the California Constitution, as enacted by Proposition 140 in 1990, violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution).
171. 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see supranotes 66-71 and accompanying text (setting forth the constitutional
analysis for ballot access cases).
172. 504 U.S. 428 (1992); see Bates 1, 958 F. Supp. at 1457 (stating that the Anderson-Burdick test evolved
as the Supreme Court addressed "ballot access cases," which considered the significance of assigning to the First
and Fourteenth Amendments rights that are implicated when laws governing the procedures and eligibility
requirements for political parties or candidates to appear on ballots are challenged).
173. See Bates 1 958 F. Supp. at 1457 (defining ballot access cases); see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428,430 (1992) (upholding a state's refusal to allow write-in votes); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279,293 (1992)
(striking down a requirement that small political parties gather a large number of signatures in every state district
in which they run candidates); Storerv. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,730 (1974) (holding that California has a compelling
interest in protecting the integrity of its political process by requiring disaffiliation by an independent candidate).
A state may deny ballot access to an independent candidate if the candidate has been affiliated with any political
party within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,
479 U.S. 189, 190-91 (1986) (reversing the Ninth Circuit and upholding a requirement that third party candidates
receive one percent of the primary vote in order to appear on the general election ballot).
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rather defined a qualification for holding legislative office.17 4 The district court
acknowledged the similar questions presented in Eu--decided by the California
Supreme Court and Bates I-and explained the effect the Eu decision had on the
T A constitutional interpretation of an issue by
district court's decision in Bates 175
the California Supreme Court, such as Proposition 140's lifetime legislative term
limits provisions, does not violate the United States Constitution, and is not binding

on federal courts.1 76 While a state supreme court decision construing the United
States Constitution should be granted great respect, the federal courts are not

obligated to follow such decisions. 1" However, the California Supreme Court's
of the term limits provisions of Proposition 140 does bind federal
construction
78
1

courts.

The district court held that California's lifetime term limits, expressed in
Proposition 140, violated the rights of voters under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 79 In reaching its conclusion, the court held that: (1) term limits were
not content-neutral, but rather a "content based restriction on the ability of voters

to vote for candidates of their choice;"'

0

(2) the sovereignty interests asserted by

174. See Bates I, 958 F. Supp. at 1455 n.7 (explaining that Proposition 140 effectively requires that
candidates may not seek reelection to an office which they have held for two terms if they are a Senator and three
terms if they are an Assemblymember. This prevents a class of individuals from running for office and denies voters
the opportunity to vote for such candidates).
175. Id. at 1456.
176. See iUL(drawing support from Watson v. Estelle, 886 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1989), and holding that
state supreme court decisions construing the Federal Constitution do not bind federal courts).
177. See Watson, 886 F.2d at 1095 (affirming that this proposition is a well established principle of
constitutional adjudication in the federal courts); see, e.g., Pigee v. Israel, 670 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1982)
(indicating that a federal court is not bound by a state court's interpretation of a federal question); Bryant v.
Civiletti, 663 F.2d 286, 292 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (providing that a federal court is not bound by the decision of
a state supreme court that a statute violated the U.S. Constitution); Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161, 1166 (8th
Cir. 1981) (stating that ifa state's standard differs from federal standards, federal courts will not be bound by state
court decisions); Industrial Consultants, Inc. v. H.S. Equities, Inc., 646 F.2d 746,749 (2d Cir. 1981) (providing that
federal courts will not give effect to a state statute that violates the U.S. Constitution); Southwest Offset, Inc. v.
Hudco Pub., Inc., 622 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a federal court is not bound by a state court's
holding bared on the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164,
1171 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that federal courts are not bound by state court determinations of federal
constitutional issues); Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400, 402 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (acknowledging the persuasive
authority of a state court's interpretation of the federal constitution).
178. See Bates 1,958 F. Supp. at 1456 (indicating that a state supreme court's construction of an initiative
controls over a federal court); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1074-75 (1997)
(advocating the certification of novel state law questions and reiterating that the state supreme courts provide the
definitive construction of state law).
179. See Bates 1, 958 F. Supp. at 1460 (stating that term limits burden plaintiffs' First Amendment right of
freedom of expression by imposing a content-based restriction upon which candidates voters may choose from; and
term limits burden plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment right to participate on an equal basis with other voters in the
election of their representatives).
180. See id. at 1463 (declaring that term limits impose a content-based restriction on the eligibility of
candidates for legislative office). But cf. League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 923 F. Supp. 266, 270 (D. Me.
1996) (holding that consecutive term limits are content-neutral).
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the state were insufficient to constitute a compelling state interest; 1 (3) lifetime
term limits were not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's interest of incumbency
reform;' 2z and (4) the State did not establish that its interest in preventing career
politicians in the state legislature was important enough to justify the burden that
term limits imposed on voting rights.'83 Moreover, the court opined that even if term

limits were required to counter the unfair advantages of incumbency, the State
failed to establish that a lifetime ban must be enacted.184
In concluding that Proposition 140's lifetime term limits violated the United
States Constitution, the district court enjoined defendants'85 from enforcing the
lifetime term limits against plaintiffs'86 and ordered the defendants to accept the
plaintiffs' declarations of intention to be a candidate and their nomination papers. 87
However, the court stayed the injunction pending the filing of an appeal 88 by the
State within thirty days, and during the pendency of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.' 89 Balancing its concerns for confusing the State's electoral

process against denying plaintiffs the opportunity to seek reelection in 1998, the
court ultimately determined that a stay was appropriate because the State's interests
were compelling, and the plaintiffs would not be permanently denied the
opportunity to seek reelection if the judgment of the court is affirmed on appeal. 19'

181. See Bates 1, 958 F. Supp. at 1466 (stating that voting rights cases interpret the Fourteenth Amendment
to provide limited leeway to states in determining the structure of political representation). The Supreme Court has
stressed the importance of providing all voters with the opportunity to participate equally in the political process.
lId at 1466. A decision by a State to enact term limits does not shield the state from constitutional review, nor entitle
it to a deferential standard of review. Id The court concluded that only two of the State's interests were compelling,
"its sovereignty interest in defining its own political institutions and its interest in reducing the unfair electoral
advantages incumbents enjoy." Id at 1471.
182. See id. at 1468 (asserting that term limits would facilitate the elimination of incumbency advantages;
however, the State failed to establish that alternative constitutional reforms which were less intrusive would not
accomplish the same goal).
183. See id. at 1467 (stating that the State failed to demonstrate that solely preventing the pursuit of
legislative careers obstructs competitive elections or electoral representation).
184. See id. at 1468 (concluding that the State did not establish that a permanent ban on incumbents seeking
reelection was necessary to overcome the unfair advantages of incumbency Proposition 140 sought to eliminate,
and implying that other narrowly tailored alternatives, such as consecutive term limits, could accomplish the same
goal while mitigating the burden on incumbents' and voters' constitutional rights).
185. Defendant Jones, California's Secretary of State, and co-defendants Clark and McCormack, respective
County Registrars for Alameda and Los Angeles County were enjoined. Id. at 1471.
186. See Bates 1, 958 F. Supp. at 1471 (specifying only plaintiffs Bates, Escutia and Friedman).
187. See id (acknowledging that all other eligibility requirements must be met).
188. See id (invoking Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 62(c), which addresses the issue of injunction pending
appeal). The court noted that due to the serious constitutional questions raised, the balance of hardships favored
the State, the party subject to the injunction). Id.
189. Id. at 1472.
190. See id. (stating that the State presented compelling arguments concerning the constitutionality of term
limits, which outweighed the plaintiffs' opportunity to seek reelection).
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C. The Courtof Appeals
1. Three Judge Panel
A three judge panel19' for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
92
judgment of the district court, but based its conclusion on a different rationale.
In its decision, the court of appeals did not decide whether a state may adopt
lifetime term limits for its legislators without violating the Constitution.!"t Instead,
the court struck down the initiative because voters were not afforded adequate
notice of the permanency of the limitation which Proposition 140 imposed. 194 The
court concluded that the initiative imposed a severe limitation on the peoples'

fundamental rights, and the lifetime ban Proposition 140 imposed on state
legislators was conveyed ambiguously to the voters.'" Reasoning that neither the
text of the initiative, the proponents' ballot arguments, nor the state's official
description explaining the measure't 6 mentioned that a lifetime ban would be
imposed, the court held Proposition 140 invalid."9 Also, in comparing Proposition
140 with initiatives from other states which have passed lifetime term limits,' 98 the
court was troubled by the conspicuous absence of text explicitly mentioning a
lifetime ban, which easily could have been incorporated in the initiative.' 99

191. Bates!!, 127F.3d839 (9thCir. 1997). CircuitJudges Sneed, FletcherandReinhardtcomprisedthepanel
with Judge Reinhardt writing the opinion, joined by Judge Fletcher, and a dissent filed by Judge Sneed.
192. See id. at 844 (invalidating the initiative because the measure failed to mention the severe limitation--a
lifetime ban-imposed in either the initiative proponents' arguments, or the State's official description of the
measure which constituted inadequate notice).
193. See id. (recognizing thatastate has a compelling interest in determining the qualifications ofits officials,
which may constitutionally justify having lifetime term limits, however the court ultimately did not decide this
question).
194. See id. (indicating the absence ofthe express mention ofthe lifetime term limits imposed by Proposition
140 in surrounding ballot materials).
195. See id. (acknowledging the measure was ambiguous on its face). But see Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d
492,504, 816 P.2d 1309, 1315,286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 289 (1991) (upholding Proposition 140, by concluding that the
average voter likely understood that Proposition 140 imposes a lifetime ban).
196. See Bates 1!, 127 F.3d at 844 (basing its holding on a lack of notice of the severe limitation Proposition
140 imposed on voters by imposing alifetime ban). But see supra note 51 and accompanying text (stating that the
Legislative Analyst's summary statement of a measure is not intended to provide comprehensive information on
the measure).
197. See Bates II, 127 F.3d at 844 (asserting that voters were not afforded adequate notice of the severe
limitation which the initiative would impose).
198. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (listing states other than California which have enacted
lifetime bans); see, e.g., OR. CONST. art. II, § 19, cl.I (providing that Oregon's constitutional provision imposed
the following lifetime ban: "No person shall serve more than six years in the Oregon House of Representatives,
eight years in the Oregon Senate, and twelve years in the Oregon Legislative Assembly in his or her lifetime.")
(emphasis added).
199. See Bates 11, 127 F.3d at 844 (emphasizing that no mention of a lifetime limit could be found in the text
of the initiative, the legislative analysts's analysis, or the proponents' ballot argument). However, the opponents'
ballot argument repeatedly referenced a lifetime ban. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 52, at 71.
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2. En Banc Review
Shortly following the three judge panel's decision, a majority of the justices in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently agreed to hear the case. 20 0 On
appeal, the State argued that the plaintiffs' right to pursue this action in federal
court was barred by the res judicata effect of the California Supreme Court's
decision in Eu.201 However, the eleven judge panel,202 in an opinion written by
Circuit Judge Thompson, concluded that California's "public interest exception' 2 3
justified reexamination of the previously litigated constitutional issue in Eu, which
subsequently was raised in Bates III.'
The en bane court disagreed with the three judge panel decision that invalidated
Proposition 140 based on insufficient notice to California voters that a lifetime ban
would be imposed0 5 Instead, the en bane court adopted a view consistent with the
California Supreme Court in Eu, holding that Proposition 140's lifetime ban should
be upheld.2°

The court analogized the language of Proposition 140 affecting legislators207 to
the language of the Twenty-Second Amendment to the Constitution affecting the

office of the President.20 8 While neither Proposition 140 nor the Twenty-Second
Amendment to the Constitution contain express language of a lifetime ban on the
respective offices, the en bane court emphatically noted that despite the absence of
the term "lifetime" in the Twenty-Second Amendment, there is no confusion that

200. See Bates 111,
131 F.3d 843, 844 (9th Cir. 1997) (indicating that a majority of the active judges of the
full court voted to rehear the case en bane).
201. See id. at 845-46 (rejecting the State's argument that res judicata served as a bar).
202. The panel was comprised of Chief Judge Hug and Circuit Judges: Browning, Schroeder, Fletcher,
Pregerson, Thompson, O'Scannlain, Trott, Rymer, Kleinfeld and Hawkins.
203. See Bates III, 131 F.3d at 845-46 (stating that California provides a "public interest exception" to the
doctrine of res judicata which allows a court to reexamine the merits of a previously litigated issue of public
importance); see also Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 11 Cal. 4th 607, 622, 905 P.2d 1248, 1256,47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 108, 116 (1995) (holding that an exception to the doctrine of resjudicata applies when the issue previously
litigated involves an issue of public importance and there are unusual circumstances favoring reexamination of the
issue).
204. See Bates ll1, 131 F.3dat 845-46 Qustifying the exercise ofthe public interest exception in Bates l after
Eu previously addressed the same issues by noting that the California Supreme Court decided Eu without the benefit
of a lower court record, there was a paucity of case law addressing the issue of term limits at the time Eu was
decided, and subsequently two significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions had been decided).
205. See id. at 846 (stating that sufficient notice was provided to California voters that Proposition 140
required a lifetime ban).
206. See U (agreeing with the California Supreme Court that the relevant ballot materials and the
surrounding context of the measure made it clear that Proposition 140 required a lifetime ban).
207. See id. (providing that Proposition 140 does not express that the term limits applicable to legislators are
less than absolute); see also U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXII, § 1 (providing that a person may not be elected President
more than twice, but failing to contain express language of a lifetime ban).
208. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XXII, § 1 (stating that "No person shall be elected to the office of the President
more than twice... ").
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the language imposes a lifetime ban on the office of the President after two terms
of service.20 9
The en banc court relied on "the relevant ballot material and the surrounding

context," 210 including media attention, to support its conclusion that sufficient

notice was provided to the voters.2 This information on Proposition 140 was not

only circulated to California voters in the official ballot pamphlet, 212 but extensive
media coverage also emphasized the result of a lifetime ban if Proposition 140 was
approved, including a 21competing
measure on the ballot that provided for
3

consecutive term limits.

In assessing the constitutionality of Proposition 140's lifetime term limits, the
en banc court, similar to the district court in Diamond,1 4 set forth the analysis of
Burdick, wherein the court must weigh the asserted injury to plaintiffs' First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights against the interests presented by the State as
justification for burdening the plaintiffs' rights.215
The plaintiffs' asserted rights were framed by the Bates III court as: (1) voters
have a right to vote for the candidate of their choice; and (2) an incumbent has a
right to continue to run for his or her office.21 6 The court emphasized that the

209. See Bates 11I,131 F.3d at 846 (asserting that it is well-settled that an individual may not serve more than
two terms as President pursuant to the Twenty-Second Amendment of the Constitution).
210. Id
211. See id. (claiming that sufficient notice that Proposition 140 required a lifetime ban was provided to the
voters).
212. See Bates III, 131 F.3d at 846 (holding that the relevant ballot materials and the surrounding context
clearly conveyed that Proposition 140 required a lifetime ban); Bates I1, 127 F.3d 839, 864 (9th Cir. 1997) (Sneed,
J., dissenting) (drawing support from the unambiguous phrases used in the arguments against Proposition 140 which
include "banned for life"); Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 505, 816 P.2d 1309, 1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 289
(1991) (providing that the opponent's ballot language contained in Proposition 140 vigorously reiterated and
emphasized the requirement of a lifetime ban); BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 52, at 71 (noting that phrases such
as "banned for life" and "lifetime ban" appear in the arguments against Proposition 140 eleven times).
213. See Bates 11, 127 F.3d at 865 (Sneed, J., dissenting) (asserting that the awareness of the lifetime ban
embodied in Proposition 140 was heightened due to a competing initiative on the ballot, Proposition 131, which
provided for consecutive term limits, as opposed to the lifetime limits in Proposition 140); Steven A. Capps,
Lawmakers Lying Low in Capitol Quietly Fighting Props. 131, 140, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 16, 1990, at BI
(explaining that when legislators compared Proposition 140 and Proposition 131, most legislators looked less
favorably on Proposition 140 because it imposed lifetime term limits); see also Paul Jacobs, Term Limits Would
Oust Lawmakers and a System, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1990, at Al (distinguishing Proposition 140, which "would
limit lifetime service" in the Legislature, from Proposition 131, which would "force members of each house to move
on after 12 consecutive years," but would allow them to seek office again after "sitting out a term"); Charles Price
& Ed Bacciocco, Term Limits. Is This a Far,Far Better Thing Than We Have Ever Done Before?, CAL. J., Oct.
1990, at 498 (commenting that Proposition 140 is more restrictive than Proposition 131, which allows officials to
run again for their respective offices after sitting out a term).
214. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text (setting forth the method for determining the standard
to apply to state election restrictions).
215. See Bates III, 131 F.3d at 846 (providing that the court would apply strict scrutiny review if Proposition
140 severely burdened plaintiffs' rights; but if Proposition 140 imposes only reasonable, non-discriminatory
restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State's important regulatory interests
are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions).
216. See id. at 847 (stating the rights the plaintiffs sought to vindicate).
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lifetime ban imposed by Proposition 140 cannot be characterized as content-based
or discriminatory on the basis of political party or under the constitutionally
protected classes of race, religion or gender. 2 7 Accordingly, Proposition 140's term
28
limits on state officeholders were classified as a neutral candidacy requirement,
which a State may impose through its regulatory power.2 19
The burden imposed on plaintiffs' rights by Proposition 140's lifetime ban were
slight and overcome by the legitimate interests presented by the State.220 Proposition

140's term limits undeniably impact the absolute ability and choices of the electors
to select their representatives, however, this is true for any qualification for

office. 221 Moreover, "California voters apparently perceived lifetime term limits for
elected state officials as a means to promote democracy by opening up the political
222
process and restoring competitive elections. This was their choice to make.
Finally, the court of appeals, sitting en bane, concluded that Proposition 140's
lifetime term limits did not violate the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.' The en bane panel reversed the district court and vacated the district
court's injunction enjoining enforcement of the Proposition. 224
IV. LEGAL AND SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS

A. Legal Impact
1. Jurisdiction
2
Despite the en bane court's conclusion that the "public interest exception" 2

provides an exception to res judicata, there is a compelling argument that a state's

adoption of term limits on state legislators fails to raise a federal question. 226 The

217. See id. (determining Proposition 140 does not impose a discriminatory restriction).
218. See id. (providing examples of other neutral candidacy qualifications, such as age and residency, while
reiterating that lifetime term limits do not constitute a discriminatory restriction).
219. See id. (clarifying that once an incumbent has served in a single office for a number of years, he or she
is not barred from seeking other state offices); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (noting that
states may create barriers limiting the field of candidates from which voters may choose).
220. See Bates II, 131 F.3d at 847 (asserting that the slight burden Proposition 140 imposes on plaintiffs'
rights is overcome by legitimate state interests).
221. See id. (conceding that imposing qualifications or limitations on running for office impacts a voter's
right to vote for whom they wish).
222. Id.
223. See id. (characterizing term limits on state officeholders as a neutral candidacy requirement).
224. See i. (discussing the vacation of the district court's stay pending appeal).
225. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text (outlining the "public interest exception" to resjudicata).
226. See Bates 111, 131 F.3d at 847-48 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (indicating that an appeal from a state
supreme court concerning state term limits was dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court due to the absence of a federal
question); see also 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (providing that a federal question is
raised in any civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States and that district courts
generally have original jurisdiction in civil actions involving citizens of different states and where the matter in
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district court, the court of appeals' three judge panel, and the majority opinion in
the en bane hearing largely ignored the precedential authority of Moore v.
McCartney.Y7 In contrast, Judge O'Scannlain's concurrence in the en bane hearing
relied heavily on the precedential authority of Moore.m Judge O'Scannlain boldly
highlights and challenges whether a federal court had jurisdiction to hear the Bates
case at all.Y9
In Moore, which was decided in 1976, the Supreme Court was presented with
the opportunity to rule on term limits for state officials in an appeal from the West
Virginia Supreme Court, State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney,230which upheld term

limits on state executive officials.2 t The Supreme Court responded by summarily
dismissing the case for want of a federal question.Y2 Similar to the reasoning in
Moore, Judge O'Scannlain's concurrence in Bates III explained that "[s]ummary
dismissals for want of a substantial federal question are decisions on the merits that
bind the lower courts until subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court suggest
otherwise. ' '
In 1995, two decades after Moore, a divided Supreme Court decided Thornton,
which held that States may not impose additional qualifications for the offices of
Representative or Senator.2 4 Judge O'Scannlain, sitting en bane in Bates III,
incorporated Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion in Thornton, s which cites Moore,
and explained that the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from Maloney v.
McCartney,36 "on the ground that limits on the terms of state officeholders do not

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000).
227. 425 U.S. 946 (1976). See generally Bates III, 131 F.3d 843 (providing no reference to or mention of
Moore in the majority opinion).
228. See Bates III, 131 F.3d at 847-48 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (arguing that the decision in Moore that
a state's action to limit the terms of its own elected officials failed to raise a federal question was a decision on the
merits, and consequently binding lower courts).
229. See Bates 111, 131 F.3d at 847 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (suggesting the utter absence of a federal
question precluded jurisdiction to hear the case).
230. 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1976).
231. See Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976) (dismissing an appeal from State ex reL Maloney v.
McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1976)) (involving a state imposed term limit of two consecutive terms for the
state governor, and concluding that limits on state officeholders do not even raise a substantial federal question
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
232. See Bates III, 131 F.3d at 848 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (acknowledging the Supreme Court
dismissal of an appeal from the West Virginia Supreme Court which upheld term limits for state executive

officials).
233. Id (quoting Wright v. Lane County Dist. CL, 647 F.2d 940, 941 (9th Cir. 1981)).
234. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995) (concluding that neither the states
nor Congress may impose additional qualifications on Representatives or Senators).
235. See Bates 111, 131 F.3d at 848 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Thornton addressed the
issue of whether states could limit the terms of members of Congress, not state elected officials); see also Thornton,
514 U.S. at 845 ("Nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each State of the power to prescribe eligibility
requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress. The Constitution is simply silent on this
question.").
236. 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1976).
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even raise a substantial federal question under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." 237 The precedential value of Moore can be distinguished in its
application to Thornton, due to the arguably material distinction that Thornton
sought to limit the terms offederal officials, while Moore focused on limiting the
terms of state executives. 238 However, Moore appears to be almost directly on point
in deciding Bates.239 Indeed, Bates presents "the same question the Supreme Court
dismissed in Moore for want of a substantial federal question: the constitutionality
of term limits on state officeholders." 2Q
Thus, in order to dismiss the precedential value of Moore, a court must find a
constitutionally significant difference between executive and legislative term limits,
or between lifetime and consecutive term limits.2" Case law provides compelling
support for the proposition that term limits on state officeholders are
constitutional.242 Indeed, over twenty states have adopted constitutional restrictions
limiting the ability of incumbents to succeed themselves. 243 In Maloney-Moore
involved a limitation on consecutive terms of a Governor was considered, rather
than the lifetime ban on state legislators presented in Bates. The Eu court, which
upheld the lifetime ban on state legislators as constitutional, asserted that "many if
not all of the considerations mentioned in Maloney 44... would apply with equal
force to the legislative branch."'24
The Ninth Circuit in Bates summarily dismissed the precedential value of
Moore in a footnote citing intervening doctrinal developments which "strongly

237. Bates 11, 131 F.3d at 848 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
238. See id. (inferring that Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S: 946 (1976), may not have been compelling as
precedent in Thornton).
239. See id.
(mentioning that Moore's relevance is compelling when applied to state term limits).
240. Id. (emphasis added); see id.
(implying that Moore's application to Bates, which involves term limits
on state officials, is more compelling than its application to Thornton, which involved term limits on federal
officials).
241. See id (asserting that Bates must be distinguished from Moore in order to ignore Moore's precedential

value).
242. See idat 849 n.l (providing numerous examples ofstate term limit measures which have been upheld);
see, e.g., Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F. Supp. 587, 595 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (upholding lifetime term limits
for city officials); League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 923 F. Supp. 266, 272 (D. Me. 1996) (sustaining
consecutive legislative term limits), aft'd, 82 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1996); Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F.
Supp. 816,822 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (approving consecutive legislative term limits), affd, 45 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995);
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 359-60 (Ark. 1994) (sustaining lifetime legislative term limits),
aff'd on other grounds,514 U.S. 779 (1995); Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 524, 816 P.2d 1309,1328, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 302 (1991) (allowing lifetime legislative term limits); Cawdrey v. Redondo Beach, 15 Cal. App. 4th
1212, 1231, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 189 (1993) (approving lifetime legislative term limits); Maddox v. Fortson, 172
S.E.2d 595, 596-97 (Ga. 1970) (upholding consecutive executive term limits); Nevada Judges Assn. v. Lau, 910
P.2d 898,902-03 (Nev. 1996) (upholding lifetime judicial term limits).
243. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 520, 816 P.2d 1309, 1326, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 300 (1991)
(providing that such limitations serve a rational public policy of enhancing the political process).
244. See id.at 521, 816 P.2d at 1326, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (listing (1) eliminating unfair incumbent
advantages, (2) dislodging entrenched political machines, (3) restoring open access to the political process, and (4)
stimulating electorate participation as state interests advanced by voters in Maloney).
245. Id.
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suggest that continued reliance on Moore is unwarranted." 24 While several
noteworthy ballot access cases, including Thornton 7 and Burdick,"s have been
decided by the Supreme Court between Moore and Bates, such cases fail to detract
from Moore's precedential value.' 9 While the cases subsequent to Moore have
involved peripheral ballot access issues to the court, Moore directly addresses the
issue before the court in Bates, the constitutionality of state-imposed term limits on
state officeholders.?
Recent courts which have looked to Thornton for guidance on the issue of state
imposed term limits on non-federal officials, have found the guidance to be illusory.
The Supreme Court's holding in Thorntonwas narrowly based on the Qualifications
Clauses of the Constitution, rather than First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds
traditionally presented in state term limits challenges, including Bates."5
Additionally, the Supreme Court has only found the presence of a federal question
involving First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges in two lines of ballot access
cases,2 2 wealth-based restrictions, 3 and restrictions which impose burdens on new
or small political parties, or independent candidates. 254 A failure to provide ballot
access in the aforementioned cases might effectively result in the exclusion of
unique ideas and viewpoints from the political process.2 5 In contrast, the imposition
of state term limits raises no similar concerns because
they equally affect every
2 56
politician regardless of party affiliation or ideology.

246. See Bates II, 127 F.3d 839, 851 n.13 (9th Cir. 1997) (asserting that determining the constitutionality of
Proposition 140 is not controlled by Moore).
247. See Part l1.B (providing a discussion of Thornton).
248. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (holding that sufficient ballot access is maintained
despite the prohibition on write-in voting).
249. See Bates 11I, 131 F.3d at 850 (stating that intervening decisions by the Supreme Court have not
weakened the precedential value of Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976), which squarely addresses the issue
of state imposed term limits on state legislators).
250. See id. (expressing concern that the court failed to adequately consider the precedential authority of
Moore in deciding Bates).
251. See id. at 850 (indicating that U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), may be entirely
inapposite); see also Bates 11,127 F.3d at 868 (explaining that Thornton does not stand for the proposition that term
limits categorically violate the Constitution, and therefore is not controlling).
252. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (providing a definition and discussion ofballot access cases).
253. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (invalidating a candidate filing fee provision
which disproportionately burdened those of lower economic status).
254. See Bates I11, 131 F.3d at 850 (remarking that the term limits on state officials do not neatly fit into
either of these categories); see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992) (approving Hawaii's ban
against write-in candidates); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,806 (1983) (striking down state-imposed filing
requirements on presidential candidates).
255. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982) (holding that burdensome requirements on
small and independent parties may infringe on their First Amendment interest of ensuring freedom of association);
Bates III, 131 F.3d at 850 (explaining that a federal question is raised in cases imposing restrictions on wealth or
burdens on new or small political parties or candidates due to the significant potential to infringe upon First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights).
256. See Bates 111, 131 F.3d at 850 (stating that term limits on state legislators do not have a disparate impact
of any identifiable group).
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Thus, if Moore is followed and continues to stand for the proposition that term
limits on state legislative and executive offices do not present a federal question,
absent a subsequent contrary decision by the U.S. Supreme Court,25 7 the California
Supreme Court's decision in Eu should provide the final word on the interpretation
and validity of Proposition 140's lifetime term limits on state legislators.
Conveniently, the court in Eu reached the same decision that the court of appeals
reached in Bates II: lifetime term limits on state legislators are constitutional. 8
2. Due Processand Notice
The question of whether California voters received notice of the lifetime ban
in Proposition 140 received considerable attention in Bates and in Eu.259In Eu, the
court conceded that Proposition 140's language is ambiguous, 2W but ultimately held
that a lifetime ban was intended."e The district court in Bates I, apparently relying
on the California Supreme Court's construction of Proposition 140 in Eu, did not
substantively address the issue of notice. 2 In contrast, the court of appeals' three
judge panel invalidated the district court's opinion in Bates Ibased on the failure
of the initiative's language to provide the voters with adequate notice of the severity
of the limitation involved.263 Finally, the court of appeals held there was sufficient
notice that Proposition 140 required a lifetime ban.2 However, the en banc court
softened its holding by stating that, "[a]ssuming, without deciding, that a federal
court may determine whether a state has given adequate notice to its voters in
connection with a statewide initiative ballot measure dealing with term limits on
state officeholders, we hold that California's notice with regard to Proposition 140
was sufficient."
Judge O'Scannlain, concurring in Bates III, found that
257. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in CalifbrniansforaCitizen Government v. Legislatureofthe State
of California,503 U.S. 919 (1992) (mem.).
258. See Bates!!!, 131 F.3d at 847 (holding that Proposition 140's lifetime term limits do not violate voters'
or candidates' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights); see also Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 525, 816 P.2d
1309, 1329, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 303 (1991) (holding that the interests served by Proposition 140's lifetime term
limits outweigh the right of voters to vote for incumbent officeholders and the right of incumbents to seek
reelection).
259. See Bates III, 131 F.3d at 846 (citing that California voters received notice of the lifetime ban imposed
by Proposition 140 through ballot arguments and extensive media coverage); Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 505, 816 P.2d at
1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (stressing that ballot arguments forcefully and repeatedly emphasized the measure's
lifetime ban, and the average voter understood that Proposition 140 imposed a lifetime ban); see also supranotes
210-13 and accompanying text (providing examples of media coverage surrounding Proposition 140).
260. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 504, 816 P.2d at 1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (indicating that the measure's intent
to impose a lifetime ban was not clearly expressed).
261. See id. (asserting that the framers of and the voters for Proposition 140 contemplated a lifetime ban).
262. See Bates 1, 958 F. Supp. at 1446 (recognizing the California Supreme Court's construction of the term
limits provisions of Proposition 140's application).
263. See Bates II, 127 F.3d at 844 (stating the measure was ambiguous on its face and failed to mention the
severity of the limitation it sought to impose in the measure's text).
264. See Bates 11, 131 F.3d at 846 (acknowledging that voters received adequate notice of the lifetime ban).
265. Id. (emphasis added).

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 30
Proposition 140 provided sufficient notice of lifetime term limits.m However,

Judge O'Scannlain cautioned that a court should not presume that notice is required
or even within the province of a federal court to determine. 267 Judge O'Scannlain

suggested that a notice requirement has no basis in case law or the Constitution, but
is instead drawn from "antipathy for and distrust of the initiative process."'

While

legislation by initiative may be perceived to carry a greater sense of political force
because it is the direct will of the people, the Supreme Court reviews both popular
and representative legislation by the same standard.269 It is of no constitutional
significance that legislation was enacted by initiative.2
While the Supreme Court has invalidated voter initiatives,271 such action should

not be misconstrued to indicate that legislation pursued through the initiative
process is subject to a higher scrutiny than traditional legislation.2 72 Indeed, Bates

III reaffirms the proposition that any legislation which impacts an individual's
constitutional rights will be carefully reviewed, however enacted.273

Judge O'Scannlain cautioned that to impose a due process "notice" requirement
on legislation by initiative would require the federal courts to look behind initiatives
to determine that voters were capable of understanding the potential consequences

266. See id. at 853 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that Proposition 140 provided
adequate notice to the voters that a lifetime ban would be imposed).
267. See id. (stating that the notion that voters must be provided with notice when a measure would infringe
upon their fundamental rights has little legal support); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
822 n.32 (1995) (providing that the method by which Proposition 73 was adopted, by a vote of the people rather
than through the state legislative process, is moot because the petitioners failed to assert that the constitutional
analysis was contingent upon or affected by the method in which laws were adopted).
268. Bates 11,
131 F.3d at 854 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring); see Kelso, supranote 43, at 374 (asserting that
initiatives are often poorly-drafted and thought out).
269. Bates 11I,
131 F.3d at 846; see Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court (Institute of
Governmental Advocates), 25 Cal. 3d 33, 42, 599 P.2d 46, 51, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860 (1979) (providing that it
is unreasonable to presume initiative measures receive less scrutiny than proposed legislation in light of the media
coverage, ballot information, and public debate which the measures receive). But see Kelso, supranote 43, at 374
(arguing that in practice courts strictly construe voter initiatives); see also Higgins, supranote 43, at 35 (arguing
that referenda, particularly those implicating minority rights, receive tougher scrutiny than laws passed through the
legislature since less compromise is involved in the drafting of initiatives).
270. See Bates 11I,
131 F.3d at 854 n.6 (providing that the Supreme Court has invalidated several voter
initiatives because they were often facially neutral measures which involved discriminatory intent, not because the
court raised the level of scrutiny for popular legislation). But see Kelso, supranote 43, at 367 (stating that voter
initiatives should not be afforded the presumption of constitutionality, but rather should be subject to a careful
review).
271. See Bates 111,
131 F.3d at 854 n.6 (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring) (providing examples of voter initiatives
which the Supreme Court has invalidated); see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution which prohibited all legislative, executive, orjudicial action designed to
protect homosexual persons from discrimination, and indicating that the motivation for the amendment was
"animus" toward a specific class of persons); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982)
(holding that while the initiative was facially neutral, it was motivated by racial purposes).
272. See Bates 111,
131 F.3d at 854 (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that both representative and
popular legislation are subject to the same standard of review).
273. See id.
at 854 n.6 (O'Scannlrain, J., concurring) (asserting that when important constitutional rights are
implicated, representative and popular legislation are both subject to careful review).
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of their actions and that they acted accordingly.2 74 In addition to the seemingly
unworkable task of a court discerning whether voters understood what they were
voting for, there is no due process right to notice in the enactment of legislation.2 75
When legislation is pursued by initiative, the electorate is presented with the actual

text of the measure,276 an impartial state analysis,'m arguments for and against the
measure,278 and often receives the benefit of extensive public discourse through the
media and the political process.27 9 In contrast, representative legislation is largely
advanced outside the stream of public conscience, in committee rooms and whitedomed buildings, without consultation with the general electorate.W Thus,
recognizing that the Supreme Court reviews both popular and representative
legislation by the same standard, it would be incongruous to impose a due process
right to notice in the initiative process when a similar right to notice is not required
for representative legislation.2 t In light of the respective legislative processes and
practical access to relevant information, it would be difficult to assert that initiative
legislation should be held to a higher standard than representative legislation in
providing notice. Indeed, support for the opposite proposition would appear more
plausible since the initiative process provides the electorate with the essence of
direct democracy and a reflection of the people's will. 2 2 However, history and
Supreme Court precedent weigh against this interpretation.2 3 Courts have been

274. See id. at 854 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (acknowledging that such a task would be beyond the scope
of the judiciary); see also Kelso, supranote 43, at 342-43 (asserting that it is doubtful that a substantial number of
voters read, and even fewer understand, all the materials presented in the ballot pamphlet).
275. See Bates III, 131 F.3d at 855 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (rejecting the temptation to establish a due
process right to notice in the initiative process).
276. See CAL. ELEc. CODE § 9084(a) (West 1995) (requiring that the ballot pamphlet include a copy of the
text of each state measure).
277. See id. § 9085(b) (providing that summary statements shall be prepared by the Legislative Analyst).
278. See id. § 9084(c) (stating that the ballot pamphlet distributed to voters must include a copy of the
arguments and rebuttals for and against each state measure).
279. See Kelso, supra note 43, at 341 (indicating that voters derive most of their information relating to
initiatives from the mass media newspapers, television and radio).
280. See id. at 353 (stating that deliberative procedural steps are required in proposing legislative initiatives
which are similar to proposed statutes); id. at 344 (acknowledging that the process is generally controlled by our
elected representatives and by implication not by the general public).
281. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915) (providing that there
is no due process right to notice before the government acts in a legislative capacity).
282. See JaneS. Schacter, The Pursuitof "PopularIntent":InterpretiveDilemmasin DirectDemocracy,105
YALE LJ. 107, 148 (1995) (advocating that popular legislation reflects the voter's perspective and thus inherently
protects the electorate's prerogatives); see also Are Term Limits Constitutional?The Voters Have Spoken, Now the
Courts Must Decide, CAL LAW., Feb. 1993, at 37 [hereinafter Are Term Limits Constitutional?](arguing that
approaching term limits through the initiative process challenges a state's commitment to direct democracy).
283. See Bates11I,131 F.3d at 854 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (indicating that the Supreme Court extends
a presumption that legislators recognize and anticipate the impact of their laws, and that the Supreme Court is
reluctant to invalidate legislation on the ground that a legislative body was ignorant of the consequences of its

action).
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reluctant to invalidate legislation on the basis that a legislative body or the voters
were unaware of the effect of their actions.'
The conclusion in Bates III dangerously holds that information included in the
ballot and the surrounding context provided voters with sufficient notice that
Proposition 140 required lifetime bans.28 This was an unnecessary step for the court
to take. Instead, the court could have exclusively relied on the finding that
Proposition 140's impact on plaintiffs' rights was a neutral candidacy requirement
which was neither severe, nor beyond the authority of the State to impose.2
B. Social Ramifications
The initiative process in California is closely guarded by the electorate as a
vehicle for direct democracy.2 7 Arguably, the imposition of term limits through the
initiative process challenges the prospect of governance by direct democracy. 2 8
Some commentators argue that voter initiatives are often "an attempt to 'circumvent
the legitimate legislative process.' 219 Yet, the initiative process is recognized as a
legitimate legislative process.290
Initiatives often focus on controversial issues which the legislature has failed
to address or that private interest groups seek to advance.291 The issue of term limits

284. See i.(articulating the judicial presumption that legislators are aware of the consequences of the laws
which they enact); see, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (holding that the
statutory language was clear and courts must presume that Congress intended what it enacted); see also Taxpayers
to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 51 Cal. 3d 744, 768, 799 P.2d 1220, 1235, 274
Cal. Rptr. 787, 802 (1990) (indicating that the court must presume that the voters thoroughly study and understand

the content of initiative measures presented to them to facilitate the right of the electorate to enact legislation
through the initiative process).
285. See Bates II, 131 F.3d at 846 (affirming the holding of the California Supreme Court that voters were
afforded notice of Proposition 140's lifetime ban). Empirical research indicates that electors do not significantly
rely upon the ballot arguments contained in ballot pamphlets. See Kelso, supranote 43, at 342 (indicating that
limited empirical research supports the conclusion that voters place minimal reliance upon ballot arguments in the
ballot pamphlet). There is also little regulation concerning the content of the ballot arguments, which should lead
the judiciary to view them with caution. See id at 343 (noting that proponents and opponents of measures are
constrained by virtually no controls when drafting their ballot arguments). Moreover, it is "pure fiction" that a
significant percentage of voters have educated themselves about the details of most initiatives. See iad
at 342-43
(presenting empirical research to support the common sense conclusion that electors are not significantly influenced
by the ballot arguments contained in the ballot pamphlet).
286. See Bates 111,
131 F.3d at 847 (implying that the restrictions imposed by Proposition 140 are not
discriminatory or content-based).
287. See Friedelbaum, supra note 150, at 1570 (asserting that the initiative process provides a direct
opportunity for voters to convert popular discontent into political action).
288. See Are Term Limits Constitutional?,supra note 282, at 37 (acknowledging that pursuing term limits
through the "initiative system really test[s] our commitment to direct democracy").
289. Higgins, supranote 43, at 34.
290. See CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 (providing that the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative
and referendum).
291. See Higgins, supra note 43, at 35 (highlighting the controversial and sensitive nature of initiatives and
the advocacy groups which seek to advance them).
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can be traced to voter discontent and frustration with the electoral process which
was perceived to unduly favor incumbents, undermining a competitive election
process. 292 Unsurprisingly, the initial plaintiffchallenging the implementation ofthe
initiative was the target of the initiative's sweeping change, the California
Legislature.2 93 This challenge reinforced a belief that incumbents were more

concerned with protecting their offices than following the will of the electorate.
Despite receiving the support of a majority of the voting electorate, the fate of
Proposition 140 ultimately rested on a decision by the judiciary to determine
whether the measure was constitutional.2' Unlike ordinary legislation in which
legislators have taken an oath to consider the constitutionality of laws they enact,
initiative proponents have no corresponding responsibility. 295 Moreover, ordinary
legislation involves control by our elected representatives who consider the impact
of legislation in numerous hearings and committee meetings, and with the aid and
benefit of experts. 29 In contrast, legislation adopted through the initiative process
is often drafted by private interest groups, without adequate consideration of the
opposing and legitimate interests,29 and who are willing to stretch the limits of
constitutionality. 298 The debate over the virtues and drawbacks of direct democracy
through the initiative process continues, fueled by several recent high profile
initiative measures which have come under judicial scrutiny. 299 Both traditional
legislation and initiatives are subject to judicial scrutiny, and judges who declare
measures approved through either process unconstitutional "risk being labeled

292. See CAL. CONST. art. IV,§ 1.5 (setting forth a preamble to Proposition 140 outlining the initiative's
purpose).
293. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991).
294. See generally Bates 11I,
131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (indicating challenges to the

constitutionality of Proposition 140); Bates I, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (providing appellate court review of
the constitutionality of Proposition 140); Bates 1,958 F. Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.
3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991) (involving a constitutional challenge to Proposition 140).
295. See Kelso, supra note 43, at 339-40 (emphasizing that legislators must assess the constitutionality of
every statute, while private interest groups are under no similar obligation).
296. See idat 344 (providing that hearing and speeches comprise a legislative history of a measure which
are controlled by legislators).
297. See id at 339 (outlining some of the risks associated with legislating through the initiative process).
298. See Higgins, supranote 43, at 35 (indicating that advocacy groups are willing to test the boundaries of
constitutionality in order to further their agenda).
299. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632 (1996) (invalidating Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution
that withdrew legal protection exclusively from homosexuals from the injuries caused by discrimination as violative
of the Equal Protection Clause); Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995) (concluding that Measure
16, a ballot initiative approved by the voters on the Oregon ballot in November 1996 which would have allowed
terminally-ill adults the ability to obtain a doctor's prescription for a fatal drug dosage for the express purpose of
ending their life, was overinclusive and violated the Equal Protection Clause), vacatedby Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d
1382 (9th Cir. 1997). In California, several initiatives which received strong support from the electorate vere
also
struck down as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995) (enjoining
Proposition 187, which sought to regulate undocumented immigration in California); California ProLife Political
Action Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1299 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (concluding that the political campaign
contribution limits imposed by Proposition 208 were too low, violating candidates' First Amendment rights of
freedom of expression).
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'activists' and 'antidemocratic."'"' 0 These labels are unfairly placed. °1 In fact,
judges who invalidate measures which violate the Constitution, are simply fulfilling
their roles and responsibilities as judges.'
The decision in Bates stands for the proposition that the judiciary adopts a
"procedurally-blind" approach when determining the constitutionality of legislation.
In contrast, the California Supreme Court has not gone this far. Rather, possibly
recognizing that the electorate ultimately has the power to recall the justices who
frustrate the will of the voters, the court has adopted a policy presuming the validity
of initiative measures "unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and
unmistakably appears."' 3 Because federal judges are not subject to voter recall, one
could argue that they do not risk offending the electorate by striking down measures
approved through the initiative process. Alternatively, state judges, who must face
the voters and seek the continued confidence to serve in the judiciary, have adopted
''3 4
a glowing policy of deference to "jealously guard the precious initiative power. 0
One hopes that politics and cynicism do not drive this distinction, yet the distinction
remains nonetheless.
V. CONCLUSION

The emotional issues of the right to vote, the political process, and the
constitutional framework of our nation collided in a modern test of democracy
embodied by Bates v. Jones. 30 5 Under Bates, following a healthy brush with the
Constitution, the will of the voters prevailed. 306 The passage of Proposition 140
captured the powerful sentiment of a state, and possibly a nation, empowered to
bring about change in the way states are governed.3 7

300. See Higgins,supranote 43, at34 (emphasizing thatjudges are often harshly criticized for declaring laws
unconstitutional).
301. See California ProLife Council PoliticalAction Comm, 989 F. Supp. at 1302 (providing that the
assertion that judges place more reliance on their view of the social good in resolving constitutional issues, rather
than the law, is unfounded).
302. See Higgins, supranote 43, at 34 (indicating that ajudge who strikes down a law that is violative of the
Constitution is not an activist, but is just doing his or her job).
303. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492,501, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313,286 Cal. Rptr. 283,287 (1991).
304. See id. (providing that the initiative power should be broadly construed to facilitate the democratic

process).
305. 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
306. See supra Parts H.A.l, Ill (discussing respectively the following cases which address the
constitutionality of Proposition 140: Legislaturev. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991)
and Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1997), and aff'g, 131 F.3d
843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
307. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.5 and supra note 163 and accompanying text (referencing Proposition
140's preamble which sets forth the motivation of the initiative).
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To date, the Supreme Court has not considered a term limits case that

specifically involves state legislators.m Despite several state supreme and appellate
court decisions which have upheld challenges to state imposed term limits, (and
some which have applied for a writ of certiorari and been denied),3 the rulings310
of
lower federal district courts and state supreme courts will continue to control.

Indeed, commentators have predicted that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
consider any further cases concerning term limits in any form.31' Consistent with
such predictions, the Supreme Court declined to hear Bates.31 2 Thus, state and lower
district courts must continue to uphold their concurrent obligation to preserve the
"values and structural integrity of the constitutional system,, 31 3 while states may
elect to explore and experiment with new ways of governance to advance their

constitutional interests of structuring their legislature,314 promoting competitive
elections, 315 and reinvigorating the democratic system of governance. 6
Finally, despite the populist approach used in enacting Proposition 140, it is
important to emphasize that it is not the role of the judiciary to judge the wisdom
of Proposition 140's lifetime ban on state legislators, but rather its
constitutionality. 31 7 The decision in Bates affirmatively illustrates that states, and

by extension voters, continue to wield significant control and self-determination in
their structure of state governance, and are empowered to shape their political
process by imposing content-neutral restrictions on their legislators.

308. See Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946,946 (1976) (holding that state executive term limits failed to
raise a substantial federal question).
309. See, e.g., Arkansas Term Limits v. Donovan, 117 S.Ct. 1081, 1081 (1997) (upholding the Supreme
Court of Arkansas' refusal to place a constitutional amendment initiative on the state ballot, that directed state
legislators and Arkansas members of Congress to propose and secure an amendment to the United States
Constitution which would limit the number of terms that members of Congress may serve); Bates III, 131 F.3d at
847 (upholding the same voter initiative imposing a lifetime ban on state legislators challenged in Eu); Eu, 54 Cal.
3d at 524, 816 P.2d at 1328, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 302 (upholding a lifetime ban on state legislators imposed by voter
initiative).
310. SeeFriedelbaum,supranote 150, at 1580 (preferring that state appellate courts serve as the"fom of last
resort" to determine the constitutionality of implementing state imposed term limits).
311. See ia (implying the absence ofneed to hear a term limits case because the issue of the constitutionality
of both state and federal term limits have already been addressed and decided upon by the United States Supreme
Court).
312. See Bates v. Jones, 118 S. Ct. 1302 (1998) (denying certiorari).
313. Friedelbaur, supra note 150, at 1580.
314. See Bates 111, 131 F.3d at 859 (Rymer, J., concurring) (providing that the structure ofa state's legislature
is among the state's strongest interests).
315. See i. at 847 (speculating that California voters viewed lifetime term limits as a vehicle to achieve a

more competitive political process).
316. See id.
(indicating that California voters anticipated that the goals of democracy and an increase in the
participation of the political process would be furthered by lifetime term limits).
317. See id.at 860 (Hawkins, J., concurring) (remarking that the judiciary's role is to determine the
constitutionality of legislation, not its merits).
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